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Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama
George L. Priest'
This paper addresses the modern grounds for punitive damages reform.' It
focuses on particular problems relating to punitive damages verdicts in Alabama,
but the issue extends substantially beyond the Alabama case. Punitive damages
verdicts are relatively infrequent in many jurisdictions.2 From time to time,
however, an occasional jury can render an enormous punitive damages verdict
even in ajurisdiction where punitive damages awards are infrequent. Oftentimes,
the trial or an appellate court will remit such a verdict, and the pattern of
punitive damages infrequency will be restored. There is reason to believe,
however, that in recent years the Alabama experience has been substantially
different. As I shall describe in more detail below, beginning in the early 1990s,
punitive damages verdicts increased in Alabama both in frequency and
magnitude. While some of these verdicts were remitted in part on appeal,3 there
was no clear signal from the Alabama Supreme Court or any court of appeal as
to what limits there might be to continued punitive damages awards. Perhaps as
a consequence, the frequency and magnitude of punitive damages awards
continued to escalate and to dramatically affect the entire civil dispute process.4
As a consequence, punitive damages claims and awards have become a routine
feature of the Alabama civil liability regime.
This paper addresses the Alabama phenomenon. While the Alabama
experience, to my knowledge, is unique-there are no studies showing civil jury
verdicts of this magnitude in any other American jurisdiction-there is no reason
to believe that the phenomenon is unique to Alabama jurisprudence. Indeed,
oddly enough, the procedures for trial and appellate review of punitive damages
verdicts had been developed in the caselaw more completely for Alabama than
for any other United States jurisdiction.' Instead, the recent Alabama experience
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1. This paper is an expansion of testimony presented to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
on Punitive Damages Tort Reform in April 1995. It presents some results of empirical work
conducted since that presentation and discusses the recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1966).
2. See Michael Rusted, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1992).
3. For a recent example, see Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, No. 1940357, 1996 WL 202543
(Ala. Apr. 26, 1996) ($12.5 million punitive damages verdict remitted to $5 million); but cf Foster v.
Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, 656 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 1994) ($250,000 punitive damages verdict by trial judge
vacated by Alabama Supreme Court reinstating jury's S1 million punitive damages award).
4. For the extraordinary effects that repeated punitive damages verdicts have had on tort claims,
see infra text accompanying notes 16-20.
5. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991); TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (U.S. Supreme
Court approval of Alabama punitive damages review procedures).
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seems reflective, more generally, of the consequences of permissive appellate
review of jury trial punitive damages verdicts. As suggested by the Alabama
experience, punitive damages verdicts can begin to snowball. As citizens see
large punitive damages verdicts awarded in increasing numbers of cases,
expectations and understandings begin to change. The large punitive damages
verdict becomes the norm, rather than the exception. This paper documents that
experience in Alabama and discusses the effects of such judgments on deterrence
and on the welfare of consumers.
Within the past weeks, the United States Supreme Court has once again
reviewed an Alabama punitive damages verdict and, for the first time, determined
that the verdict and, to some extent, current Alabama punitive damages review
procedures, fail constitutional norms.6 This paper reviews that decision in the
context of the broader Alabama experience, and discusses the likelihood that the
new approach toward the review of punitive damages judgments adopted by the
Supreme Court can halt the spiraling punitive damages experience in Alabama
or other jurisdictions.
Part I reviews the Alabama experience to document what I regard to be the
increasing commonality of Alabama punitive damages verdicts and claims. Parts
II and III address the effects of routine punitive damages claims and verdicts.
Part II focuses on deterrence, the principal rationale for punitive damages, and
Part III discusses consumer welfare. Part II shows that the deterrent effect of
punitive damages verdicts has been vastly overrated, especially with respect to
corporate defendants. Part III explains how the principal victims of excessive
punitive damages verdicts are consumers, and low-income consumers most of all.
Finally, Part IV discusses whether effective punitive damages reform can be
effected through the courts, reviewing the Supreme Court's decision in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore,7 or whether a legislative constraint on punitive
damages is necessary. It is, of course, too early to determine what the effect of
the BMW decision will be; indeed, it is premature to anticipate how the Alabama
Supreme Court will respond to the decision. Part IV, however, hazards some
preliminary thoughts on the extent to which the more careful inquiry now
required by the United States Supreme Court can affect a punitive damages
"environment," an environment now reaching to the level of citizen-juror
expectations, such as that in Alabama. Part IV suggests that there are reasons
to believe that legislative approaches to the punitive damages problem may still
be required.
I. THE INCREASING COMMONALITY OF PuNrIvE DAMAGES
Forty years ago, punitive damages verdicts were exceptionally rare in all
jurisdictions and were available against only the most extreme and egregious of




defendant actions. 8 The world of civil litigation is surely different today,
especially in Alabama. Both the number and, especially, magnitude of punitive
damages judgments have increased dramatically. Indeed, in Alabama, the
frequency of claims for punitive damages has increased to approach the routine.
These claims affect the settlement process by increasing the litigation rate9 and,
necessarily, the ultimate magnitude of settlements, even in cases that are settled
out of court.
A recent study of punitive damages trial verdicts illustrates the phenome-
non." Punitive damages verdicts of greater than $1 million are alleged to be
rare, and verdicts in the multi-millions extremely rare." Alabama appears to
be an exception. In 1991, there were eleven reported punitive damages verdicts
equal to or greater than $1 million and individual verdicts of $25 million, $45
million and $50 million. 2 In 1992, there were twenty-two reported punitive
damages verdicts equal to or greater than $1 million and individual verdicts of
$18 million, $25 million and $33.2 million. In 1993, there were fifteen verdicts
equal to or greater than $1 million and individual verdicts of $12.5 million, $19.5
million and $65 million. Finally, in 1994, there were twelve verdicts equal to
or greater than $1 million and individual verdicts of $22.7 million, $25 million 3
and $33.5 million.
The frequency of million dollar and multi-million dollar verdicts over this
time period is astounding and is suggestive of the commonality of punitive
damages in Alabama. There remains, however, a better test of the commonality
thesis. Some commentators continue to dismiss concerns about punitive damages
on the grounds that even these numbers are not very large, given the number of
jury verdicts reported across the country in any year.' 4 In the American system
of civil justice, of course, very few verdicts of any kind are reported, relative to
the number of claims filed, since only two to five percent of civil cases filed
8. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 9 (5th ad. 1984).
9. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973); George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation,
9 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1980).
10. These statistics are derived from a study by Forrest Latta, a summary of which formed the
basis for the Alabama Supreme Court's statistical appendix in Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Johnson,
No. 1940357, 1996 WL 202543 (Ala. April 26, 1996).
11. See Rustad, supra note 2.
12. All statistics presented are those for non-wrongful death cases only. Alabama procedures
provide that the only measure of damages for wrongful death is punitive damages. It may well be
appropriate to include wrongful death awards in this study both because the Alabama standards for
wrongful death recoveries are equivalent to the standards for punitive damages recoveries in other
cases and because the procedure for trial and appellate review is the same. See Green Oil Co. v.
Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989). Nevertheless, the unusual character of Alabama verdicts in
comparison to those of other states is best seen if the Alabama wrongful death experience is excluded
since Alabama wrongful death procedures differ from those of virtually all other states.
13. Gallant v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., Barbour County, AL, CV-93-50 (1994). See discussion
infra text accompanying notes 27-36.
14. See Rustad, supra note 2.
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ever proceed to a verdict."S The better test of the commonality of punitive
damages verdicts derives from a study of claims.
Recently, I participated in an empirical study of the frequency of punitive
damages claims in Alabama. A study of claims-the proportion of all tort cases
filed that incorporate a claim for punitive damages-is the best test of the
commonality of punitive damages expectations. The study, which to my
knowledge is one of the only studies of punitive damages claims, was conducted
in three Alabama counties: Bullock, Lowndes, and Barbour Counties. Each of
these counties is a relatively rural locale with a small population and without
substantial industry. We studied all tort actions filed in these counties in the past
several fiscal years to determine the numbers in which punitive damages were
claimed. To summarize the most recent statistics, we found that in the fiscal
year 1992-93, 76.5% of all tort cases filed in Bullock County included a punitive
damages claim; 65.1% in Lowndes County; and 78.3% in Barbour County.'
The exceptionally high proportion of punitive damages claims and the
universality of such high proportions over each of the counties studied are
striking and nearly incredible. Again, the study was not limited to claims
involving high dollar amounts or product liability claims or, even, claims against
corporate defendants; the study addressed all tort claims. Anyone familiar with
our civil justice system knows that most tort actions involve relatively routine
forms of accidents, such as traffic accidents. 7 That 65% to 78% of all tort
actions over a given fiscal year included punitive damages claims starkly
challenges the notion that punitive damages are an infrequent and seldom
invoked remedy across American civil law.
Incredible as these numbers may seem, in the succeeding fiscal year, the
proportion or number of tort cases including a punitive damages claim actually
increased in each of the counties. During the 1993-94 fiscal year, an extraordi-
nary 95.6% of tort cases filed in Bullock County included a punitive damages
claim; 78.8%, in Lowndes County. In Barbour County, the proportion of tort
cases including a punitive damages claim decreased from 78.3% to 72.1%, but
the absolute number of punitive damages claims increased during 1993-94 by
over 40%.
Much of the debate over punitive damages proceeds in the form of
competing anecdotes in which a defender of our modem regime presents a case
of exceptionally egregious defendant behavior deserving of punitive damages and
15. George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 527,
Table 1 at 540 (1989).
16. These data were collected under a research project organized and directed by myself and
Professor James R. Barth, Auburn University, and conducted by Cornerstone Research, Menlo Park,
California, for the case Gallant v. Prudential. Data are available from the author.
17. See George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U.




a supporter of reform presents an opposite example."8 The Alabama numbers
belie anecdotes. No one can plausibly claim that 72.1% to 95.6% of all accident
cases over an entire year in any county of the United States involve the form of
exceptionally egregious defendant behavior that might merit substantial punitive
damages. These numbers show that the role of punitive damages has changed
dramatically in the Alabama civil justice system from an occasional remedy
invoked against outrageous action to a commonplace of tort law practice.
These numbers also belie the commonly-heard defense that actual punitive
damages verdicts are rare and that many of those awarded by juries are later
reduced on appeal such that there is no substantial effect. Debate can be had on
what is meant by the term "rare" and what constitutes, in terms of magnitude of
verdicts, a "substantial" effect. The impression is often suggested, however, that
even for the nation in its entirety, punitive damages claims amount to nothing
more than a handful.
Our Alabama study demonstrates that this is a great misimpression. Again,
we did not select the largest cities in Alabama or industrial or manufacturing
centers; in fact, we did just the opposite. The counties that we studied in
Alabama are rural, with modest populations and a relatively non-urbanized
citizenry. For example, Bullock County has a total population of only 11,042,
4,040 of whom are employed, and a per capita income of $9,212. Lowndes
County has a total population of 12,658, with 5,300 employed, and a per capita
income of $10,628. Barbour County is somewhat larger, with a total population
of 25,417, with 12,400 employed, and a per capita income of $12,100.9 None
of these counties, however, resembles in the slightest metropolitan areas such as
Miami, Los Angeles, or Dallas.
What did we find? In 1993-94, despite these small populations, punitive
damages claims in these rural counties constituted far more than the claimed
nationwide "handful." In Bullock County, 43 of 45 tort actions included a
punitive damages claim; in Lowndes County, 52 of 66 tort actions included a
punitive damages claim; in Barbour County, 93 of 129 tort actions included a
punitive damages claim. Are punitive damages in Alabama insignificant? The
claims reported above are quite recent and remain in the litigation pipeline.
Looking to much earlier claims, however, our study in Alabama showed that the
magnitude of punitive damages judgments affirmed by the Alabama Supreme
Court from 1987 through the first half of 1994 totalled $53.2 million,"0 equal
to roughly $13 per Alabama citizen.
This study demonstrates that the number and magnitude of affirmed punitive
damages verdicts is only the very small tip of an extraordinary iceberg. Again,
18. Indeed, I present an anecdotal case-though a telling one-4nfra text accompanying notes 27-36.
19. These statistics are taken from Alabama Dept. of Commerce, 1994 Economic Abstract of
Alabama at Tables 5-1, 5-4, 5-7, 5-13, 5-17, 9-7, 9-11, 13-4, 13-5, 13-6, 13-7, 13-9.
20. This figure again excludes wrongful death awards. See supra note 12. If such awards were
included, the amount equals $109 million, equal to $26 per capita. See Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v.
Johnson, No. 1940357, 1996 WL 202543 app. (Ala. Apr. 26, 1996).
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it is universally conceded that only 2% to 5% of cases filed ever proceed to
verdict. Thus, it is not surprising that the systematic observation of any single
type of verdict is relatively rare. What the Alabama numbers show is that the
availability of unlimited punitive damages affects the 95% to 98% of cases that
settle out of court prior to trial. It is obvious and indisputable that a punitive
damages claim increases the magnitude of the ultimate settlement and, indeed,
affects the entire settlement process, increasing the likelihood of litigation. Thus,
as shown in the Bullock, Lowndes, and Barbour County figures, modem
Alabama rules with respect to punitive damages impose these effects on a
majority of even settled cases.
The next two Parts review the effects of punitive damages verdicts in
contexts in which such verdicts have become commonplace. Part II discusses
the deterrence justification of punitive damages. Part III addresses the effects of
punitive damages on consumers, low-income consumers in particular.
II. Do PUNITIVE DAMAGES SERVE A NECESSARY DETERRENT PURPOSE?
Virtually every supporter defends punitive damages on the grounds of
deterrence, accompanied by an anecdote or two involving persons who suffered
serious losses in contexts in which most observers would agree that the
respective defendant should have prevented the accident. Generally, the
anecdotes speak for themselves: I have never once seen a careful study in a
specific case showing that a punitive damages judgment of some particular
amount was necessary to deter some particular wrongful behavior. Instead, the
argument proceeds by implication. The basic defense of punitive damages--and
I believe that it is the only serious defense-is the implication that large,
unlimited punitive damages verdicts are necessary to control injurious activities
in society. Put in a slightly different way, it is implied that without the
availability of unlimited punitive damages awards, potential defendants,
especially corporate defendants, would face no deterrent threat to prevent them
from causing injuries.
Forty years ago, in a tort law regime that provided little in the way of
consumer remedies, it might have been believed that ever-increasing civil liability
verdicts, including punitive damages verdicts, would serve to reduce the number
of accidents.21 That view, however, has been totally discredited today, and I
know of no serious tort scholar publishing in a major legal journal who could
maintain it. Instead, it is widely accepted-and it is a routine proposition of a
first-year modem torts course-that compensatory damages---economic losses
and pain and suffering-serve a complete deterrent purpose in addition to their
role in compensating injured parties. Compensatory damages impose costs on
21. For a discussion of the development of modem tort law, see George L. Priest, The Invention
of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14
J. Legal Stud. 461 (1985).
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defendants who wrongfully fail to prevent accidents, costs equal in amount to the
injuries suffered. Compensatory damages internalize injury costs to defendants
where some action has wrongfully injured an innocent party.
Indeed, the strongest theory in the modem tort academy is that full compensa-
tory damages generate exactly the optimal level ofdeterrence ofaccidents-not too
little and not too much.' For purposes of deterrence or accident prevention, there
is no need for punitive damages of any dimension, not to mention unlimited
punitive damages, given the availability of full compensatory damages. Of course,
this is a theoretical conclusion, and there remains dispute in the academy as to
whether, as an empirical matter, court, or juries calculate compensatory damages
with perfection in every case or in every context. Thus, substantial academic
attention has been given to the refinement of liability rules so that the deterrent
effects of compensatory damages may be sharpened.
Given the role of compensatory damages as a deterrent, however, the analysis
of punitive or other exemplary damages becomes substantially different. The only
justification on grounds of deterrence for any exemplary award beyond the
compensatory is that compensatory damages are inadequate for some reason, such
as juries awarding damages which are too low in some dimension or some set of
injuries going undetected or perhaps being too insignificant individually tojustify
litigation.23 The only plausible defense of punitive damages on deterrence
grounds is to restore aggregate damages to a level equal to that which is fully
compensatory.
Opponents of punitive damages reform currently avoid this issue, but their
failure to confront it suggests the ultimate weakness of their opposition. Again,
anecdotes involving individuals suffering serious losses are not generally helpful
to the analysis. I am extremely sympathetic-as all of us are-to individuals
suffering serious injuries. We all wish that wrongfully injurious actions might have
been avoided. Given a wrongful injury, we all want the victim to receive full
compensation for economic losses and pain and suffering.
The question for punitive damages tort reform, however, is as follows: Given
full compensation to the victim, is there some affirmative deterrent purpose served
by awarding further damages? Is there some reason to believe that the payment of
full compensatory damages will fail to deter the defendant, such that some further
multiple through punitive damages is absolutely necessary? For corporate
defendants, the answer surely is no. Corporate defendants who must maximize
profits net of costs must necessarily take the prospect of compensatory damages
into account when determining how to invest in accident prevention. Again, this
analysis presumes full compensation. If there were some reason to believe that
juries were systematically undervaluing economic losses or pain and suffering,
22. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987);
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (4th ed., 1992); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis
of Accident Law (1987).




punitive damages might be necessary to make up for the shortfall. Of course, the
opposite may be true. Many, including myself, believe that juries overvalue
compensatory damages, including pain and suffering,justifying increased limits on
pain and suffering awards, especially in contexts of expanded liability.1 Barring
such a shortfall, however, there is no justification for punitive damages on
deterrence grounds.
The analysis is, perhaps, somewhat different in the context of individual, non-
corporate defendants who are less subject to cost constraints and, perhaps, more
inclined to behave unconscionably. This is the reason that exemplary or punitive
damages are often awarded in cases involving intentional harms such as assault.
As administered by juries, however, our current civil liability regime
approaches the issue exactly backwards. In our current regime, large punitive
damages verdicts are seldom awarded against non-corporate defendants. I know
of no one objecting to a punitive damages cap on the grounds that it will impair the
deterrence ofprivate individuals. Instead, large punitive damages verdicts are most
typically awarded against corporate defendants who, as profit maximizers (a
motivation often irrationally held against them), will be carefully responsive to
compensatory damages. Corporate defendants need no punitive damages verdict
to encourage them to take all cost-effective precautions to prevent injuries;
compensatory damages alone achieve that result. Thus, the increasingly common-
place plaintiff lawyer's charge to a jury to "send the corporate defendant a signal"
ignores entirely the universally accepted academic view that, to a corporate
defendant, full compensatory damages are not only an effective signal, but also the
only signal needed.
III. Do PUNiTiVE DAMAGES HELP OR HURT CONSUMERS?
If the effect of punitive damages were to benefit consumers or if their effect
were even neutral to the consumer interest, we might not be concerned that
punitive damages are unnecessary to deter corporate defendants from injurious
behavior. The central problem of punitive damages, however, is that, except in
the rare cases of jury undervaluation of damages or underlitigation, punitive
damages settlements and verdicts affirmatively harm consumers, low-income
consumers most of all.
Where punitive damages become commonplace in civil litigation, as in
Alabama, or even where they become a significant risk to business operations,
consumers are harmed because expected punitive damages verdicts or settlements
must be built into the prices of products and services. The effect of the
increased frequency and magnitude of punitive damages recoveries of modem
times has been to increase the price level for all products and services provided
in the United States economy. To observe this phenomenon is not to say that




injured consumers should go uncompensated. If a consumer suffers an injury
that can be attributed to some wrongful activity of a defendant, whether
manufacturer or service provider, that consumer should receive compensation for
economic losses and for reasonable non-economic losses, such as pain and
suffering.25 In contrast, punitive damages, by definition, go beyond the
compensatory. The problem with the increasing commonality of large punitive
damages verdicts and settlements, such as those in Alabama, is that the awards
to some consumers of greater than compensatory damages must be built into the
prices paid by all other consumers.
It is an obvious implication of this proposition that low-income consumers
are most seriously harmed by our current punitive damages regime. First, low-
income consumers have less money generally and, regardless of the product or
service, are more seriously affected in terms of the purchasing power of their
limited resources when price levels increase. Secondly, and most importantly,
low-income consumers are not the typical beneficiaries of large punitive damages
verdicts or settlements, at least not on a systematic basis. Again, research of my
own currently in progress shows that low-income consumers, if injured, are less
likely to seek an attorney; even with an attorney, they are less likely to sue; less
likely to recover; and, again by definition, less likely to recover large damage
judgments since their lost income is typically low and pain and suffering awards,
which are highly correlated with lost income, equally low.
Put more simply, where punitive damages verdicts and settlements are
frequent and large, low-income consumers are forced to subsidize high-income
consumers as expected punitive damages awards are built into the prices of
products and services. All consumers-high-income and low-income alike-pay
the increased prices; chiefly the high-income gain the return in high compensato-
ry and punitive damages recoveries. Again, a low-income individual will receive
a punitive damages windfall, but the far more systematic effect is to harm the
low-income consumer as the prices of products and services generally are
increased to adjust for the expectation of future punitive damages payouts.
It is important to recognize that the current effect of the doctrines of
comparative negligence and joint and several liability is similar. Comparative
negligence and joint and several liability have their most general effects on
organizations or entities which engage in a large scope of activities, such as state
and municipal governmental entities, public utilities, and the like. It has become
a commonplace of modem civil litigation for plaintiffs' attorneys to join as
defendants any governmental entity or utility remotely associated with an injury.
Thus, state governments and municipalities are joined as defendants on claims
that roads were misdesigned or poorly maintained, or that a guard rail or
telephone pole could have been placed in a better position. Forty years ago,
attorneys would not have thought to include entities whose causal relationship to
25. Again, I have endorsed limits on pain and suffering awards in contexts of expanded liability,
though this issue is somewhat beyond the focus on punitive damages here. See id.
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the harm was so low or, alternatively, if they had attempted to join such entities,
the claim would have been dismissed. Today, such litigation is routine and
imposes substantial litigation expenses upon our state and municipal governments
as well as liability expenses, infrequently but chiefly under the operation of the
doctrines of comparative negligence and joint and several liability, where the
truly responsible defendants have gone bankrupt, leaving our governments and
utilities to suffer the remaining judgment.
It is clear that, for very similar reasons, operation of the doctrines of
comparative negligence and joint and several liability harms citizens in general,
but low-income citizens most of all. Damages judgments against state and
municipal governments must be paid from state and municipal financial sources.
It is well-established that state and, especially, municipal finance are seriously
regressive in effect, charging more to middle- and low-income citizens,
proportionate to income, than to relatively high-income citizens.26
These propositions about the effect of punitive damages, comparative
negligence and joint and several liability on low-income citizens may appear
abstract; however, I believe that they are generally accepted within the academic
community. To illustrate their import with greater salience, however, I would
like to present one recent example of a punitive damages verdict in Alabama:
the case that inspired the research presented above. The case will both reaffirm
the pressing need for punitive damages reform and illustrate why such reform
should be expanded to all state and federal litigation.
In the case of Gallant v. Prudential," decided by jury verdict in April
1994, Iran and Leslie Gallant sued Prudential Life Insurance Company based on
the actions of a Prudential agent. The Gallants purchased a combination life
insurance-annuity policy with a $25,000 face value at a monthly premium of
roughly $39.00. At the time of sale, the agent told them that the value of the
annuity was roughly twice what it in fact was. The agent had added together the
table indicating "Projected Return" with the table indicating the lower "Guaran-
teed Return." A jury found this action fraudulent and held the agent liable and
Prudential separately liable for failing to better supervise the agent. 8
Fortunately, the problem was discovered before the policyholder had died
or had retired to receive the annuity. Thus, to the time of trial, there was no true
economic loss beyond the failed expectation of the larger future return.
According to the transcript of the testimony, the Gallants testified that, between
the time they discovered the misinformation and Prudential called them to offer
a remedy (Prudential offered to return their premiums or to discuss adjusting the
policy), they had suffered roughly two weeks of sleepless nights and substantial
anger at having been misled. That was the extent of their "mental anguish."
26. Joseph E. Stigletz, Economics of the Public Sector 347 (1986).





Twenty years ago, cases of this nature were part of the legal field entitled
Restitution, in which the appropriate remedy was restitution of all paid premiums
or out-of-pocket costs. On very rare occasions, such as especially egregious
actions by a defendant, some courts considered awarding plaintiffs the benefit of
the bargain, say, by increasing their annuity benefits.29
Our modem world has changed. After a one and one-half day trial, an
Alabama jury awarded the Gallants damages equal to $30,000 in economic loss,
$400,000 in mental anguish, and $25 million in punitive damages. Again, the
face value of the insurance policy was only $25,000.
I do not wish to minimize the harm to the Gallants, especially the indignity
of the misrepresentation, or condone the fraudulent actions of the agent,
apparently perpetrated on several other Alabama citizens who recovered
separately. Nevertheless, there is not a single person to whom I have described
this case-not an attorney, whether plaintiff or defendant; not a liberal or a
conservative; not even a radical or idealistic Yale Law student (or faculty
member)-who has not been shocked by the outcome or who could defend it as
a rational or sensible verdict in the context of the harm. Again, many defenders
of punitive damages argue that exceptionally large verdicts are usually overturned
on appeal. Alabama's review procedure for punitive damages verdicts had been
carefully analyzed and approved by the United States Supreme Court shortly
before the Gallant trial.30 In the Gallant case, however, the judge conducting
the review affirmed the $25 million award in its entirety, though directing part
of the amount to be paid to the State.3 The case was later settled prior to the
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore.32
What will be the effect of a punitive damages verdict of this nature? The
Gallants appear to be persons of modest means (at least before the verdict).
Does a verdict of this nature help middle- or low-income consumers in the
aggregate? Unfortunately, totally the opposite is true. The insurance policy in
question-face value, $25,000-was the cheapest form of life insurance/annuity
available on the market; its monthly premium was only $39.00. Obviously, at
such a premium, the insurance carrier could not be expecting to make a
substantial profit on the policy. Indeed, an economic expert in the case for
Prudential estimated that, over the entire life of the policy, the premiums net of
payouts paid by the Gallants would increase Prudential's assets by only
$46.00.3 Prudential, like most other life insurance companies, profits more
29. See generally American Law Institute, Restatement ofRestitution and Unjust Enrichment(1936).
30. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). But see BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), discussed infra.
31. Gallant (mer. op.).
32. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (striking down a punitive
damages verdict awarded by an Alabama court).
33. Testimony of Professor James R. Barth, Auburn University in Gallant, supra note 27. Copy
on file with author.
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substantially from large dollar, rather than small dollar, policies. The expert
estimated that the verdict reduced dividends to every Alabama policyholder
(Prudential is a mutual carrier) by $323."'
How do we analyze a case like this in terms of whether punitive damages
serve a necessary deterrent effect? In his closing argument, the highly effective
attorney for the Gallants asked the jury to determine a level of damages that
would send a "message" to the giant Prudential Life Insurance Company that
fraudulent behavior on the part of an agent would not be tolerated. 5 What kind
of damages message is necessary to achieve that effect? Obviously, if the
insurer stood to gain no more than $46 over the life of the policy, any damages
judgment greater than $46 sends the insurer a message by making the policy
unprofitable. (Of course, I ignore entirely Prudential's defense costs plus the
reputational harm from the lawsuit.) The jury in the Gallant case went
substantially beyond that amount, however, in awarding compensatory damages
of $30,000 for economic loss and $400,000 for the mental anguish from the two
weeks of lost sleep and anger. It certainly cannot be argued that the jury
undervalued the Gallant's compensatory loss-indeed, the $400,000 mental
anguish award itself is extreme. The median per capita income in Barbour
County, where the Gallant case was tried, was $12,100.36 Furthermore, there
is no reason to think that the agent's behavior in other contexts would go
undetected. (Prudential later settled other cases brought by the agent's clients.)
As a consequence, there is little justification for a punitive damages award
whatsoever.
What will be the effect of punitive damages verdicts such as that in the
Gallant case? In the face of such a verdict, what is the rational response of an
insurer like Prudential, or other insurers selling similar policies? Regrettably, but
necessarily in a competitive industry, the rational response is to quit selling such
low value policies altogether. It makes very little sense to expose the company
and its policyholders to the risk of such a damages verdict given the very small
gain from the sale of such a policy.
Is this the type of product that our civil liability system should drive from
the market? Obviously not, and low-income consumers in Alabama are directly
harmed as a result. Here, the dramatically differential effects of such verdicts
on high-income versus low-income consumers are made clear. In my own view,
it is far more important to our society-if a choice had to be made-to have our
insurance industry provide life insurance coverage to low-income citizens than
to high-income citizens, since the relatively affluent of our society have other
means of providing financial security for their families. The availability of
financial protection and security at relatively low cost will be substantially
diminished if such low premium policies, as here, are no longer available.
34. Id.
35. Gallant, supra note 27, Trial Transcript at 647, April 6, 1994.
36. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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More generally, where expected punitive damages verdicts are added to the
prices of products and services, the first to feel the effect will be low-income
consumers. And where the magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rises,
imperiling the continued provision of the product or service, the first to be affected
will be those products and services with the lowest profit margins, those most
attractive to the low-income consumers. The Gallant case provides a dramatic
example of the effect. Following Gallant and other large punitive damages
verdicts, several insurers quit offering coverage in Alabama altogether.
Punitive damages reform would cure that ill to the benefit of all Americans,
especially low-income Americans. Punitive damages verdicts such as the $25
million verdict in the Gallant case encourage wasteful litigation. Indeed, litigation
seeking punitive damages judgments against financial service companies has
become an industry in Alabama. By increasing the prices of all products and
services, punitive damages verdicts and settlements reduce the purchasing power
of all Americans, especially the poor.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES REFORM: STATUTORY OR JUDICIAL?
Many defenders of the current regime question why legislatures should become
involved in civil liability reform, rather than leaving reform initiatives to the courts.
The question is particularly appropriate given that the Supreme Court has addressed
the issue ofthe excessiveness of punitive damages in several recent cases, including
the BMW decision."
First, it is evident, after many opportunities, that the Supreme Court has great
difficulty proceeding beyond what might be called a "procedural" approach to the
punitive damages problem. With the exception of the recent BMW opinion, the
only form of punitive damages control that the Court has adopted has been purely
procedural-approving a set of procedures at the state level for judicial review of
punitive damages verdicts," or disapproving a state judicial procedure as not
providing sufficient review.39 The recent BMW opinion, as I shall describe,
addresses directly the question of the excessiveness of punitive damages verdicts,
but chiefly adopts a new set of procedural comparisons for judicial evaluation.
In my view, a merely procedural approach to the punitive damages problem
will never be successful. Indeed, we have stark evidence of its failure. In 1991
in the Haslip case, the Supreme Court specifically approved the procedure for
reviewing punitive damages verdicts for excessiveness adopted by the Alabama
Supreme Court.' Viewing the Alabama procedure on its face, few can contest
37. See, e.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); Honda Motor Co.
v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 449 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
38. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 1, 111 S. Ct. at 1032.
39. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. at 2331.
40. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 1, 111 S. Ct. at 1032.
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that the review procedure appears reasonable.4 ' In practice, however, as the
Gallant case proves and as the statistics from the rural Alabama counties strongly
suggest, the punitive damages problem in Alabama, under the procedures
approved by the United States Supreme Court, has grown to epidemic propor-
tions.
The Court's recent BMW opinion, however, strikes out in a new direction.
The Court found that a $2 million Alabama punitive damages verdict in a case
involving a $6,000 compensatory economic loss to be constitutionally exces-
sive.4" The Court adopted three new metrics for the evaluation of excessive-
ness: the relation between the punitive damages verdict and 1) the "degree of
reprehensibility" of the underlying tortious action; 2) the magnitude of
compensatory losses; and, 3) criminal statutory penalties for similar offenses.43
These metrics are likely to be far more successful in constraining punitive
damages verdicts than the vague and overlapping "factors" under which Alabama
courts previously reviewed punitive damages verdicts."
Nevertheless, there remain serious questions as to how effective this form
of comparison will prove in practice. Reprehensibility is a very vague concept
and hardly susceptible of careful measurement. Similarly, the mathematical
relationship between the compensatory and punitive damages elements is an odd
judicial principle. Is there a principled reason that a ratio of 1 to 5 or 1 to 4 is
constitutionally suspect in comparison to a ratio of 1 to 2 or less? Moreover, if
the purpose of punitive damages is to deter behavior that is morally reprehensi-
ble, the relevance of the compensatory loss is not immediately evident unless an
intent to affect the magnitude of loss was a specific element of the reprehensible
action. Many totally inadvertent or accidental actions generate huge loss; many
repugnant and reprehensible actions generate little harm, measured solely in
compensatory terms of lost income, needed expense, and pain and suffering.
Perhaps the most helpful metric is the relationship to statutory criminal penalties
for comparable offenses. Here, legal analysis can be employed with some
precision, though the question then arises why, given the existence of some
criminal penalty for comparable action, punishment should be delegated to a civil
jury through a punitive damages verdict in any case.
Upon reflection, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has found it
difficult to deal with excessive punitive damages. The Supreme Court's job, in
general, is to define rights. Few would contest-I do not contest-that punitive
damages may be appropriate in some contexts. I would not support a constitu-
41. The Alabama review procedure consists of evaluating a punitive damages verdict according
to a wide and seemingly comprehensive list of relevant "factors," such as the "culpability" of the
defendant's action, the relationship of the verdict to the harm imposed, etc. See Davis Law & Rachel
Sanders Cochran, Punitive Damages and Pre- Verdict Procedures, Life of Georgia: A Bold New
Frontier, July 1996 The Alabama Lawyer 225.
42. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
43. Id.
44. On this point, see in particular, the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer in BMW.
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tional right of immunity from punitive damages (though that may well be an
important improvement over the current state of the law).
What is needed for punitive damages reform is a prudential judgment of the
appropriate cap or limit to punitive damages that will allow some room for
punishing egregious behavior but constrain the deleterious effects of unlimited
punitive damages judgments on consumers. For example, the proportional limit
of three times economic losses or $250,000 in the recently enacted products
liability legislation is a prudential judgment of that nature. But that prudential
judgment is a uniquely legislative, not judicial, exercise. Regrettably, the
President vetoed the legislation.
With respect to reform by the states, the question is somewhat different.
Punitive damages verdicts implicate both interstate and foreign commerce in a
manner that only Congress can address. Some have argued that a state without
a significant manufacturing or interstate service sector could actually benefit its
citizens by adopting an expansive civil liability regime at the expense of citizens
of other states. Alabama may well be an example of this phenomenon.
Congress is in the best position to provide a solution to this issue.
Secondly, there is one further effect of our modem punitive damages regime
that should not go unnoticed: the effect on the competitiveness of American
manufacturers and producers. Some have argued that large punitive damages
verdicts in the U.S. are neutral with respect to competitiveness since 1) foreign
courts do not award such verdicts against U.S. producers with respect to sales
abroad; and, because 2) foreign producers are equally subject to such verdicts for
sales in the United States. (Note that BMW is a German corporation.) Thus, for
United States sales, foreign producers, just like United States producers, must
add expected punitive damages and joint and several liability verdicts into the
prices of products and services. (It is often lost on these observers that an
increase in prices on account of punitive damages-even if operating neutral-
ly-is not an affirmative argument on behalf of consumers.)
This analysis, however, is only partially correct. Increasingly, foreign courts
are refusing to enforce extraordinary judgments from U.S. courts against foreign
defendants. For example, the German Federal Court of Justice (Germany's
highest court for civil and commerical matters) recently refused to enforce a
$400,000 punitive damages verdict obtained in an American court by an
American plaintiff against a German defendant on the grounds that the punitive
damages verdict was inconsistent with German public policy."s In the same
case, an intermediate United States court already had reduced the pain and
suffering damages component from $200,000 to $70,000 on the same grounds."s
45. Judgment of June 4, 1992, BGH Gr. Sen. Z., discussed in George L. Priest, Lawyers, Liability
and Law Reform: Effects on American Economic Growth and Trade Competitiveness, 71 U. Denver




Foreign judgments of this nature should be alarming both to Congress and
to United States courts. First, they are strong evidence that the current course
of American law does not command widespread assent among reasoned
commentators-yet another grounds for general punitive damages reform.
Secondly, such judgments suggest an increasing competitiveness problem facing
United States producers here in the United States. To the extent that United
States punitive damages verdicts must be enforced abroad and foreign courts
refuse to enforce them, foreign producers need not add the costs of the American
civil justice system, including punitive damages and excessive pain and suffering
awards, into the prices of products and services sold in the United States. Thus,
foreign producers can underprice American producers in sales to American
consumers here in the United States.
Ironically, although American producers and their employees are harmed by
this effect, American consumers benefit because they can obtain products and
services at lower prices without the effects of our punitive damages verdicts built
in. 7 Put slightly differently, the refusal of foreign courts to enforce large
punitive damages or pain and suffering awards from American courts represents
a type of tort reform, regrettably however, only available-prior to punitive
damages reform-to foreign, rather than to United States, producers.
These various reasons support an argument for widespread punitive damages
reform. While the punitive damages experience in Alabama may appear unusual,
there is always the potential for a substantial punitive damages verdict in any
jurisdiction. In addition, there is the potential for punitive damages verdicts to
increase in magnitude and frequency so as to become routine, as I believe to be
the case in Alabama prior to BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. It is too
early to observe any effect of the BMW decision, and it is only speculation
whether the seeming increase in precision of the three metrics defined by the
Supreme Court can change the punitive damages environment in Alabama. If
not, then some more drastic prudential judgment will be necessary to reduce the
harm to consumers from excessive punitive damages awards.
47. The June 4, 1992 judgment, discussed supra notes 45-46, involved a personal assault, rather
than harm caused in the context of product or service use, though the German Court made clear that
its opinion was meant to extend to these broader effects. Of course, there is no benefit to American
citizens where punitive damages verdicts go unenforced in the context of personal assault.
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